Corporate liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty by Koussis, Nicos et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.11.015
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Koussis, N., Martzoukos, S. H., & Trigeorgis, L. (2016). Corporate liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty.
Journal of Banking and Finance. DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.11.015
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 15. Dec. 2017
 Accepted Manuscript
Corporate liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty
Nicos Koussis , Spiros H. Martzoukos , Lenos Trigeorgis
PII: S0378-4266(16)30218-7
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.11.015
Reference: JBF 5045
To appear in: Journal of Banking and Finance
Received date: 14 July 2015
Revised date: 3 September 2016
Accepted date: 12 November 2016
Please cite this article as: Nicos Koussis , Spiros H. Martzoukos , Lenos Trigeorgis , Corporate
liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty, Journal of Banking and Finance (2016), doi:
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.11.015
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service
to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please
note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and
all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
1 
 
Corporate liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty 
 
 
Nicos Koussis
1
, Spiros H. Martzoukos
2
, and Lenos Trigeorgis
3 
 
 
  
 
Acknowledgements: 
 
We are thankful to Elettra Agliardi, Michalis Makrominas, Gloria Gardenal, Elizabeth Whalley, Van Son 
Lai, two anonymous referees, the editor Bart Lambrecht and conference participants at the 2015 European 
Financial Management Association, the 2015 Annual International Real Options Conference, the IFORS 
2014 conference and the 2013 Multinational Finance Conference.  
 
 
1. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, Frederick University Cyprus, 7 Frederickou Street, 
Nicosia, 1036, CYPRUS.  Email: bus.kn@ac.cy, Phone: +357 22394394 
2. Associate Professor, Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Cyprus, P.O. Box 20537, CY 1678 Nicosia, 
CYPRUS. : Email: baspiros@ucy.ac.cy 
3. Professor of Finance, King’s College London and Bank of Cyprus Chair  Professor of Finance, Department of Accounting and 
Finance, University of Cyprus, P.O. Box 20537, CY 1678 Nicosia, CYPRUS. Email: lenos@ucy.ac.cy 
 
  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
2 
 
Corporate liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty 
Abstract 
We examine optimal liquidity (retained earnings) and dividend choice incorporating debt financing with 
risk of default and bankruptcy costs as well as growth options under revenue uncertainty. We revisit the 
conditions for dividend policy irrelevancy and the broader role of retained earnings and dividends. 
Retained earnings have a net positive impact on firm value in the presence of growth options, high 
external financing costs and low default risk.  High levels of retained earnings enhance debt capacity but 
have a negative effect on equity value due to the likelihood of losing accumulated cash balances in case of 
default, unless offset by high external financing costs. Opposite directional effects of retained earnings on 
equity and debt create a U-shaped relation with firm value. The framework is extended to analyze 
management-shareholder conflicts, demonstrating that managers accumulate higher than optimal cash. 
 
JEL classification: G31, G13 
 
Keywords: dividends; retained earnings; growth options; real options; capital structure; default; 
debt costs   
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1. Introduction 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) established that dividend policy is irrelevant in frictionless markets. In real 
markets, dividend irrelevancy does not hold in the presence of costly external financing, default risk, 
bankruptcy costs and growth option opportunities. Developments using contingent claims analysis or real 
options provide a framework for an integrated analysis of the firm’s interrelated investment, capital 
structure and dividend policies incorporating both default risk and growth option considerations. A key 
advantage of the real options approach is the explicit incorporation of uncertainty and managerial or 
shareholder flexibility to make decisions depending on the future realization of stochastic revenues (see 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). This important strand of literature (e.g., Leland, 1994; Mauer 
and Triantis, 1994; Childs, Mauer and Ott, 2005; Mauer and Sarkar, 2005; Sundaresan and Wang, 2015; 
Liu and Mauer, 2011) has, however, largely ignored corporate liquidity and dividend policy. Contingent-
based models typically assume that any excess cash is distributed in the form of dividends, while in 
periods of negative cash flow the firm resorts to external financing to finance the shortfall. One notable 
difficulty in incorporating liquidity choice in a real options framework is dealing with path-dependency 
arising from the need to keep track of the history of cash balances retained (e.g., Acharya et al., 2000, 
p.14). In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate these issues in a real options 
setting. We present a number of propositions based on a simple analytic setup and then obtain further 
insights using a more comprehensive numerical model that incorporates revenue uncertainty, path-
dependent liquidity (retained earnings) choice, debt financing with risk of default and costly external 
financing, as well as future growth options. In our model, retained earnings are held in the form of liquid 
assets that earn a specified per-period interest. This serves as a substitute to reduce future external 
financing and the risk of costly default and incurrence of bankruptcy costs. Our main contribution is 
highlighting the negative disincentive effect to save as cumulated cash savings would be lost at default 
due to limited liability (and absolute priority rule) and quantifying the tradeoff between the default cost of 
savings and other important offsetting benefits. We obtain a number of related specific results. 
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First, we confirm that irrelevancy of retained earnings and dividend policy holds in the absence 
of default risk, provided retained earnings in the form of liquid assets earn the risk-free rate and there are 
no external financing costs. Default risk can induce a negative impact of retained earnings on unlevered 
firm (equity) value because accumulated cash holdings may be lost if the firm cannot make the debt 
payment and goes bankrupt.  
Second, the role of retained earnings is more important the higher the expected benefits from 
growth options and the greater the external financing costs.  External financing costs have a lesser impact 
on firm value when their only role is to finance liquidity shortages to avoid default. Lins et al. (2010), 
surveying CFOs from 29 countries, show that the main driver of holding liquidity is the financing of 
future investment growth opportunities. Brown and Petersen (2011) further suggest that cash balances 
enable a firm to smooth R&D spending.  Riddick and Whited (2009) (see also Milne and Robertson, 
1996) put forth a precautionary saving motive of holding cash, while Palazzo (2009) argues that cash-rich 
firms earn superior returns due to precautionary motives. Our analysis highlights the offsetting role of the 
risk of default, i.e., the risk of lost cash holdings in case of default offsetting the precautionary motive of 
accumulated cash.   
Third, the incentive to maintain high retained earnings (low dividends) is moderated by firm 
profitability and available cash balances. For firms with low profitability and low initial cash balances, 
retaining earnings may not be sufficient to avoid default; in this case, it may be better for shareholders to 
reduce cash balances and pay higher dividends, resorting to external financing in the future if needed. 
Conversely, for firms with high profitability and high initial cash balances the negative role of retained 
earnings is mitigated as the risk of default decreases; in this case, retaining earnings may play a positive 
role for shareholders because the accumulation of cash balances can be used to finance growth options 
and reduce costly external financing. This non-linear role of profitability and initial cash balances 
highlights important differences regarding the behaviour of early-stage firms having low profitability and 
cash balances vs. more-mature firms with higher profitability and accumulated cash.   
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Fourth, we show that higher revenue uncertainty increases default risk, thereby reducing the role 
and importance of retained earnings because equityholders may lose any accumulated cash balances in 
case of firm default. In the presence of growth options and debt, however, higher retained earnings may 
be beneficial when volatility is high (despite the higher default risk) because they enhance the value of the 
growth options, reduce external financing needs for funding valuable growth options while maintaining a 
high level of debt capacity.  
Fifth, higher retained earnings enhance debt capacity as the risk of default is reduced. Unless the 
firm has valuable growth options or high external financing costs, higher levels of retained earnings have 
a negative impact on equity value. The opposite directional effects of retained earnings on equity and debt 
values may thus have a U-shaped effect on firm value. Firm value maximization in this case favours high 
retained earnings and plowback when the risk of default is low (for firms with high profitability and low 
volatility) and when growth options and external financing costs are high. A low plowback instead is 
preferred under high default risk and when the value of growth options and external financing costs are 
low.  
 Sixth, in terms of investment timing, when there is low profitability (and low accumulated cash 
holdings from earlier periods), the firm would delay exercising its growth option to avoid incurring high 
external financing costs. When the firm faces high profitability (and high accumulated holdings), early 
investment exercise is more appealing as it can enhance revenues early on without the need to incur high 
external financing costs.  
 Finally, we address managerial-shareholder conflicts by conducting an analysis of optimal payout 
policy based on managerial instead of shareholder optimal retained earnings/dividend choices when there 
are costs of collective action by shareholders. Such managerial-based policies result in sub-optimally high 
cumulated cash balances, sub-optimal early exercise of growth options and delayed default. This results in 
significant agency costs which are more severe in the presence of growth options.   
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We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. Section 3 shows the theoretical 
framework based on an analytic solution with comparative statics. Section 4 presents numerical 
sensitivity results based on an extended numerical model. Appendix A proves a key result used in the 
derivation of analytic comparative statics while Appendix B describes in detail the extended numerical 
model. 
2.  Review of literature 
 Early dividend policy theories have focused on dividend irrelevancy in frictionless markets 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961), the effect of corporate and personal taxes (Brennan, 1970; Miller and 
Scholes, 1978) and the use of dividends as a signalling device for future growth prospects (e.g., Miller 
and Rock, 1985).
 
 As an alternative to an optimal capital structure, pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) 
motivated by asymmetric information posits that retained earnings should be the first source of financing, 
followed by external debt issuance, and in last resort by equity. In our model we examine a 
complementary relation between retained earnings and debt capacity mostly ignored by the pecking order 
and previous theories on dividend policy. We abstract from asymmetric information (which would 
increase the costs of external financing in our context) and signalling considerations and set aside the 
effects of personal taxes.  
Agency-based theories have thus far provided prominent explanations of firm dividend decisions. 
Easterbrook (1984) suggests that paying higher dividends provides a disciplinary mechanism reducing 
manager-shareholder conflicts; the firm should thus resort to external markets for financing any future 
investment opportunities. Analogously, Jensen’s (1986) “free-cash flow” theory posits that larger 
dividends reduce the incentives of managers to expropriate value via large accumulated cash balances. 
Lambrecht and Myers (2008) analyse capital investment policies for a firm facing management-
shareholder conflicts and show how bankruptcy costs can distort investment and disinvestment decisions. 
Our findings provide complementary evidence that managers have strong incentives for maintaining high 
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levels of cash balances to ensure their own benefits. We also show that managers may choose cash-
holding policies sub-optimally investing in growth options and leading to high agency costs.
1
 Similarly to 
Lambrecht and Myers (2008), managers may also sub-optimally delay default. Dittmar et al. (2003) find 
that firms in countries with poor shareholder protection hold more cash since shareholders cannot force 
managers to disgorge excessive cash balances. Dittmar and Maht-Smith (2007) further show that poor 
governance mechanisms lead to suboptimal use of cash balances.  
Agency conflicts among equity and debt holders over dividend policy are analysed in Hirth and 
Uhrig-Homburg (2010), who focus on the positive role of liquidity in mitigating the agency costs between 
debt and equity holders. Our analysis leads to a supportive result showing that cash balances may increase 
debt capacity. Coculescu (2011) analyses the optimal capital structure and dividend policies for a non-
renewable investment (i.e., without a growth option), showing that higher volatility favours higher 
dividends. She further shows that agency costs over dividend policy are higher for firms with high 
leverage ratios, bankruptcy costs and distance to default. Other recent evidence favours similar agency 
explanations of dividend policy and provides less support for signalling theories (Leary and Michaely, 
2011).  
Gamba and Triantis (2008) analyse a firm’s dynamic financing, investment and cash retention 
policies. Our work shares the premise that accumulated cash holdings can be used to finance growth and 
avoid costly equity issuance. Unlike them, we show that the presence of debt financing and bankruptcy 
costs results in a U-shaped relationship with retained earnings. We additionally examine in a simpler 
                                                          
1 In our model, agency conflicts of this sort can be implicitly captured by reducing the return earned on accumulated 
cash balances (see also Asvanunt et al., 2010), reflecting increasing agency costs of maintaining high cash balances.  
A recent article in the Economist, titled “The Rise of Distorporation”, published on Oct. 26, 2013, highlights that 
many firms in the US adopt structures such as Master Limited Liability (MLP) that keep no retained earnings to 
reduce the payment of corporate taxes and enforce market discipline on managers. Allen et al. (2000) suggest 
another positive side effect of paying high dividends involving an increased monitoring role by institutional 
investors who represent a clientele for firms paying higher dividends.  
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setting the conditions violating the irrelevancy of retained earnings and dividends and the role of 
profitability and revenue uncertainty.  
Acharya et al. (2000) analyse optimal dividend policy when the firm maintains cash balances to 
meet future debt obligations under costly equity issuance. Due to path-dependency complications, they 
focus on the simpler zero-coupon debt case. We examine the more general coupon-paying debt case, 
while additionally allowing for future growth options. Our setting also differs from Asvanunt et al. (2011) 
in that we allow for cash balances to be accumulated over longer horizons, capturing longer-term effects 
of risk faced by shareholders in losing cumulated cash balances as uncertainty unfolds. Copeland and 
Lyasoff (2005) analyse retention policy for an unlevered firm in the presence of growth options and costly 
external financing. Our model goes beyond theirs to also allow for default risk and the effects of 
bankruptcy costs. Kisser (2013) also recognizes that cash holdings have real option value as they can be 
used to avoid or reduce issuance costs, but he does not explicitly address the role of default risk, debt 
issuance and bankruptcy costs. His model assumes quadratic agency costs of free-cash flow, amplifying 
agency costs when cash balances are high. We also confirm that high volatility reduces the value of 
holding cash, but we attribute this to default risk rather than agency costs. Furthermore, we show that in 
the presence of growth options the role of retained earnings may be more significant at high volatility 
levels because they reduce external financing costs of valuable growth options and maintain debt 
capacity.  
Boyle and Guthrie (2003) study the effect of cash balances on the optimal timing of investment in 
the presence of liquidity constraints. They obtain a U-shaped investment trigger as a function of cash 
balances: for low cash balances the investment trigger is reduced (i.e., the firm invests earlier), while for 
high cash balances the trigger is raised (the firm delays investment). Hirth and Viswanatha (2011) 
attribute the U-shape in the investment trigger to the firm’s balancing the trade-off between present and 
future financing costs. We show that in the absence of liquidity constraints, the opposite result may 
obtain: firms with low cash balances may delay investment to avoid external financing costs, while firms 
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with high profitability and high initial cash balances may invest early to expedite receiving the growth 
option benefits as external financing costs are reduced with higher available cash.  
Empirical evidence on dividend policy relevance generally finds that dividend payouts are 
positively related to firm profitability (measured by ROA) and size (measured by assets), and negatively 
related to growth opportunities (measured by R&D/assets) (see Fama and French, 2001). Fama and 
French (2002) relate these findings to predictions of the trade-off and pecking order theories of capital 
structure. They interpret the empirical finding that firms with higher profitability and lower growth 
opportunities pay more dividends as consistent with the trade-off theory. To our knowledge, no formal 
model makes these predictions explicitly. Our model provides an explicit link of dividend payout with 
growth opportunities, confirming that dividend payout is negatively associated with growth opportunities. 
However, we show that the effect of firm profitability on dividend payout is much subtler. Equityholders 
in less-profitable levered firms may have an incentive to pay out more dividends to avoid losing 
accumulated cash holdings in the future if there is a high risk of default. When the firm has sufficiently 
large profits, it may comfortably plowback earnings to avoid defaulting or incurring high external 
financing costs, as the risk of default is lower. Thus, we posit that the observed positive empirical relation 
between profitability and dividend payout may be due to additional factors not adequately explained by 
trade-off theory. Bates et al. (2009) document an increase in cash balances over time and that cash 
holdings are positively associated with volatility, market-to-book and R&D, and negatively associated 
with leverage. The positive effect of volatility on cash holdings is justified if higher volatility drives 
higher growth option value, consistent with the hypothesis that firms accumulate cash to finance growth 
options or in the presence of managerial incentives to reduce employment risk. The positive effect of 
market-to-book and R&D is also in line with our model’s predictions of using accumulated cash balances 
to finance growth.  
 A number of empirical studies on corporate cash holdings (e.g., Opler, 1999; Harford, 1999) find 
supportive evidence in line with our finding that firms with large growth opportunities and limited access 
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to capital markets tend to hold higher cash balances (see also additional evidence on the value-enhancing 
role of cash for constrained firms by Denis and Sibilkov, 2009). Holt (2003) also finds that due to the 
presence of irreversibility and financial constraints, younger firms with growth opportunities will pay 
dividends only after they finance their investment opportunities. Denis (2011) provides an overview of 
the literature on corporate liquidity, including the role of cumulated cash in alleviating financing 
constraints. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) provide further evidence that the value of cash holdings is 
more important in high-growth industries, such as computer software and telecommunications. 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) examine the impact of cash on excess stock returns, providing evidence that 
the value of cash holdings is more important for firms with limited access to capital markets. 
Furthermore, in line with our result on the positive role of cash balances on debt (capacity) levels, they 
find a positive relationship between the level of cash balances and leverage. Anderson and Carverhill 
(2012), assuming a mean-reverting process for earnings, also find a positive role of cash balances on 
long-term debt levels. Conversely, they do not find a significant impact of growth options on cash 
holdings unless firms grow at an unusually high rate.  
The theoretical and empirical literature on liquidity has also examined the hedging role of cash 
balances. Acharya et al. (2007) show that higher cash holdings along with risky debt provide a hedge for 
constrained firms and should not be considered as negative debt. Froot et al. (1993) discuss the role of 
cross-state cash flow transfers for hedging purposes. Harford et al. (2014) argue that firms hold larger 
cash balances to reduce refinancing risk associated with short-term debt. Our model recognizes the 
positive (hedging) role of cash balances relative to costly external financing but also highlights the 
important role of default risk which adversely affects the impact of cumulating cash balances. Our main 
contribution is to bring out this negative effect of the disincentive to save as cumulated cash balances 
would be lost in case of default due to limited liability. Our numerical analysis provides an investigation 
and illustration of general conditions in which the negative incentive to save due to limited liability is 
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offset by positive incentives offered by debt capacity, growth options etc. and quantifies this important 
tradeoff. 
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1. A simple analytic benchmark and main propositions 
In this section, we study a simple model set-up analytically and derive a number of key propositions. We 
later on develop further insights illustrating other cases based on an extended numerical framework 
(presented in detail in Appendix B). This framework allows for more realistic features, such as yearly 
operating costs, debt issuance, taxes, bankruptcy costs, external financing costs and extension to more 
than two periods. Let P denote the firm’s (present value of) stochastic revenues, assumed to follow a 
geometric Brownian motion (GBM) of the form: 
                                               dZdt
P
dP
                                                                                            (1) 
where μ denotes a constant growth rate, σ the constant volatility of revenues, and dZ a standard Weiner 
process. Under risk-neutrality, the constant drift μ is replaced with the risk-free rate r. We generally 
assume the firm’s revenues actually grow at a rate r - δ, where δ is an opportunity cost or dividend-yield 
adjustment (e.g., from competitive erosion) reducing the growth rate of revenues.  
In the simple set up, we assume away any operating costs, depreciation expense  and taxes such 
that the firm cash flow at t = 0 is 0P . The firm operates for two periods, period 0 where the firm chooses 
its savings and period T where the firm decides whether to exercise a growth option. In period 0, it 
chooses the level of savings or retained earnings, ],0[ 00 PR  , which in turn determines the level of 
distributed dividends, 000 RPD  . In the second period (at T), the firm has the option to pay an 
investment cost X and obtain the revenues during the period (PT), any cumulated cash balances since 
period 0 with continuously compounded interest rx ( )exp(0 TrR X ), and any additional revenues arising 
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from the growth option, equal to an enhanced multiplier factor e  of revenue levels at T ( TeP ).  Non-
investment or default in this simple set-up is triggered by the firm not paying the investment cost X at T. 
This occurs when the annual revenues, the growth investment generated cash flows and any cumulated 
cash or savings from the earlier period are not sufficient to cover the investment cost X.
2
 Following 
standard contingent claim arguments, the Black-Scholes type equation describing the value of equity 
(unlevered firm) is: 
                   )())exp()(exp()()exp()1( 2010000 dNTrRXrTdNTPeRPE X                        (2)                 
with                         
               
T
TrTrRXPe
d
X

 )
2
1
()))exp(/())1ln((( 200
1

  ; 
               Tdd  12 .                                                                                                 
Note that to avoid negative values in the logarithmic terms in parameters 1d  and 2d , when 
0)exp(0  TrRX X , 2,1,  id i .
3
 In this case, default risk is eliminated making all cumulative 
normal terms in Eq. (2) equal to 1. The first two terms in Eq. (2) capture the value of dividends in the 
initial period, 000 RPD  , which depends on the choice of retained earnings by the firm. The third and 
fourth terms represent the value of the growth option to receive revenues at T (enhanced by a factor e). 
The exercise price of the growth option X is reduced by cumulated savings of the previous period (earning 
interest rX continuously compounded till T). As usual, the term )( 2dN  captures the risk-neutral 
                                                          
2
 The investment cost is here for simpliicity treated as non-discretionary in order to allow for default risk in a simple 
setting simplifying the analytic derivations. In the more general numerical model presented in Appendix B, we 
separate out the discretionary costs of financing the growth option from non-discretionary operational costs. The 
main insights relating to default risk remain unchanged.    
3
 This is the intuitive condition that the options’ exercise price must be non-negative.  
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probability that equity holders will exercise the growth option at T  by paying investment cost X net of the 
savings.  
The sensitivity of equity (unlevered firm) value to retained earnings 0R is thus given by:  
 )())exp()(exp()()exp()1()())exp((1 2010
0
1
2
0
0 dnTrRXrTdnTPe
R
d
dNTrr
R
E
XX 





      
(3) 
where )
2
exp(
2
1
)(
2d
dn 

 and 
 
.
)exp(
)exp(
00
2
0
1
TTrRX
Tr
R
d
R
d
X
X







 
This result is greatly simplified by noting that the term in brackets [ .] to the right of Eq. (3) is 0 (see 
Appendix A for a proof).  Thus, the impact of a change in retained earnings on equity (unlevered firm) 
value is as follows: 
                                      )())exp((1 2
0
0 dNTrr
R
E
X 


                                                                            (4)                
We thus observe that dividend or retained earnings irrelevancy holds when two conditions are met.  
Proposition 1: Dividend/retained earnings irrelevancy (unlevered firm). The retained 
earnings/dividends choice is irrelevant when: 
a) retained earnings earn the risk-free interest rate (rx = r), and 
b) there is no default risk. 
Proof: 
It is essential for irrelevance that rx = r; otherwise, a marginal change in retained earnings may enhance 
value when rx > r or it may be value reducing when rx < r. Absence of default risk further ensures that 
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1)( 2 dN  and so 0
0
0 


R
E
 . This establishes our base result that the level of retained earnings/dividends 
has no effect on unlevered firm (or equity) value.  
Corollary 1. With rx = r, the presence of default risk results in a negative (positive) relation between 
retained earnings (dividends) and unlevered firm value.  
Proof:  With positive default risk 1)( 2 dN  and rx = r it readily obtains that 0)(1 2
0
0 


dN
R
E
.  
The presence of a costly investment growth opportunity in this simple setup introduces default risk since, 
if not exercised, the firm does not invest and defaults. Our sensitivity results based on the extended 
numerical model of Appendix B (presented in the next section) confirm this key role of default risk that in 
a more general context may be caused by fixed operating costs or debt coupon payments due. Irrespective 
of the precise form or source, default risk should be absent for dividend/retained earnings irrelevancy to 
hold.  This basic idea is also found in other papers (e.g., Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)), albeit 
convoluted with other aspects of investment and financing decisions. 
Corollary 1 highlights the significant role of default risk in the dividend/retained earnings choice. 
In a setting with positive default risk where rrX  , cumulating cash balances actually reduce value for 
shareholders. Corollary 1 shows that 1 dollar of dividends foregone today and retained as savings for 
future use has a present worth of 1)( 2 dN . This is so because there is a risk that this dollar saved will be 
foregone in the future in case of default as a result of limited liability and absolute priority rule.  The 
above holds in the presence of future growth options. An enhanced value of the growth option (e.g., 
manifested via higher values of the growth expansion factor e) has a positive effect on retained earnings 
by positively affecting )( 2dN . Proposition 2 below summarizes this result.  
Proposition 2: Effect of growth options. A higher level of growth options (e) has a positive effect on the 
role of retained earnings on equity (unlevered firm) value.  
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Proof: Taking the derivative of Eq. (4) with respect to growth expansion factor e results in  
e
d
dnTrr
e
R
E
X







2
2
0
0
)())exp((
)(
, where 0)( 2 dn  and 0
2 


e
d
. Thus, 0
)(
0
0





e
R
E
. 
Despite the positive effect of growth options shown in proposition 2, since )( 2dN  is bounded above by 1, 
and for a reasonable case where Xr is close to r, a very high value of the growth option (e) cannot reverse 
the sign of 
0
0
R
E


  from negative to positive. As we show in the next section, the presence of growth 
options combined with positive external financing costs can result in a value-enhancing role of 
cumulating cash balances.   
Similarly to the case of growth options in the absence of external financing costs, high 
profitability alone also cannot reverse the negative impact of retained earnings on equity (unlevered firm) 
value. This can be readily seen from Eq. (4), where the negative effect of retained earnings can at best 
become zero as firm profitability gets very large ( 0P ). However, increasing firm profitability will 
reduce default risk and thereby improve the effect of retained earnings on equity (unlevered firm) value. 
This is summarized in proposition 3 below.  
Proposition 3: Effect of profitability. High current firm profitability (P0) will have a positive effect on 
the role of retained earnings on equity (unlevered firm) value.  
Proof:  Taking the derivative of Eq. (4) with respect to revenues (P0) results in 
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Consistent with other real options models, higher firm volatility enhances firm value in the 
presence of growth options ( 00 



E
). However, when one examines the effect of volatility on the role of 
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retained earnings, default risk again plays a central role. This leads to a negative impact of volatility 
concerning the role of retained earnings on equity (unlevered firm) value. This result is summarized in 
proposition 4 below.  
Proposition 4: Effect of revenue volatility.  Higher revenue volatility (σ) will have a negative effect on 
the role of retained earnings on equity (unlevered firm) value. 
Proof: Taking the derivative of Eq. (4) with respect to σ, we obtain 
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An important issue in these analyses is whether optimal retention/payout choices are always 
characterized by a corner (0 or 100%) solution. Our analysis in this section shows that optimal retention 
choice will result in a corner solution of zero plowback in the absence of any external financing costs and 
debt as long as rX = r (see proposition 1 and corollary 1). When rX is sufficiently larger than r, a corner 
solution at the other end (i.e., 100% plowback) may obtain. No-corner solutions are possible in this setup 
only in the presence of external financing costs (which generally drive higher retention values) combined 
with rx < r (a driving force for lower plowback).  
4. Further insights from extended numerical model 
 We next extend the above simple 2-period set up to one where the firm now operates in 3 periods: t = 0 
(current period), period t = 1 (at T1) and period t = 2 (at T2). This numerical extension enables gaining 
additional insights into the role of external financing costs, growth options and leverage. Our extended 
numerical model is described in more detail in Appendix B. Here, we sketch the key features of the model 
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and the main additional insights it is intended to capture. Under this extended setup, the (potentially 
levered) firm can invest at intermediate date t = 1 and save both at the initial date t = 0 and at t = 1. Unlike 
the simple 2-period analytic framework presented earlier, here non-investment in the growth option does 
not necessarily result in default as the firm may stay in the existing mode of operation(s). Investment in 
the growth option is discretionary and merely enhances the scale of revenues in period t = 2 via a 
multiplicative expansion factor e . The firm now faces an overhang of fixed costs denoted by C (either 
operating Ce or financial CR), and faces additional costs of external financing which are a proportion vE of 
the financial deficit. Corporate profits are taxed with a rate τ. When debt is considered, it is issued at t = 0 
and repaid in installment payments (CR) at the intermediate (t = 1) and last date (t = 2). Equity value 
obtained by the firm’s equity holders at t = 0 (E0) reflects the risk of default and associated bankruptcy 
costs which are a proportion b of the value of unlevered assets at default.
 4
 This extended setup involves 
key trade-offs facing the firm’s shareholders in their choice of retained earnings and dividend policy, 
which are summarized below.  
 First, higher retained earnings in the form of cash balances reduce the need and cost to externally 
finance a future shortfall or growth option. In the presence of debt, internal cash holdings can also be used 
to avoid intermediate involuntary default and associated bankruptcy costs. Cash holdings can further 
enhance the debt capacity of the firm and the tax benefits of debt.
5
 On the negative side, accumulated cash 
balances may be lost in case of firm default. As a result of this specific risk of foregone retained earnings 
in the event of default, debtholders get to benefit from higher levels of retained earnings and cash 
balances because they are part of the recoverable assets.
6
 For the same reason, higher cumulated retained 
earnings enhance debt capacity.  
                                                          
4
 We do not consider agency conflicts and risk-shifting between existing and new shareholders or between 
shareholders and debt holders. 
5
 These beneficial roles of retained earnings are more evident in Appendix B (see Eq. (A.1) - Eq.(A.3)) where 
retained earnings are used to finance a financing shortfall (F) and the growth option and thus reduce external 
financing costs (see Eq. (A.5) and Eq.(A.6)). Additionally, in Eq. (A.7) accumulated retained earnings reduce the 
risk of default in the last period. The negative effect of cumulating cash balances is seen in Eq. (A.7) and Eq. (A.9) 
where equity value can become zero and accumulated retained earnings lost. 
6
 See Eq. (A.8) and Eq.(A.10) in Appendix B.  
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 Second, our extended setup provides additional insights into the role of retained earnings in the 
presence of growth options. Because the enhancement of revenues from the growth investment accrues in 
a future period whereas the investment cost of expansion (X) is incurred early on (at T1), retaining 
earnings from earlier periods help in reducing external financing costs. The role of retained earnings will 
be greater the higher the accrued growth investment benefits (e) and the more the external financing 
costs.
7
 This allows the firm to pursue the exercise of the expansion option with substantial future 
dividends accruing to equity holders (due to higher expansion e) without the need to incur high external 
financing costs.       
 Thirdly, retained earnings here are held as liquid assets earning a return rx per period until they 
are used to finance growth or liquidity shortages, are distributed as dividends or end up in the hands of 
debtholders in case of default. When rX > r, the role of cash balances is enhanced. Boyle and Guthrie 
(2003) use a separate process to describe the evolution of cash balances allowing a role for the volatility 
of cash balances. They show that higher cash holdings volatility results in the firm investing earlier to 
avoid foregoing future cash flows. However, this approach does not allow for the analysis of retention 
policies. Assuming a fixed return on retained earnings here suggests that retained earnings can be used to 
reduce volatility and alleviate default in bad states. This has a beneficial role and it enhances debt 
capacity. The main drawback is that retained earnings may be lost if default occurs.    
 In what follows subsection 4.1 revisits the basic conditions under which dividend irrelevancy 
holds using our extended numerical model described in Appendix B analysing equity value without 
financial leverage (unlevered firm) but in the presence of external financing costs. We confirm the 
negative role of default risk and present additional insights for an enhanced role of retained earnings in 
the presence of a growth option and external financing costs. Subsection 4.2 revisits the factors that affect 
the retained earnings/dividend choice for an unlevered firm in this extended setup focusing on the impact 
of profitability, revenue volatility and investment growth option. In subsection 4.3 we examine the effect 
                                                          
7
 This result holds because a higher level of financing from cumulated retained earnings (F) (chosen in Eq.(A.3)) 
reduces the variable component of financing costs proportional to the deficit (Eq. (A.6)). 
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of retained earnings on debt and levered firm value in the presence of bankruptcy costs. Subsection 4.4 
considers the issue of investment timing. Subsection 4.5 examines managerial-shareholder conflicts.  
4.1. Dividend/retained earnings irrelevancy for an unlevered firm with external financing costs 
In this subsection, we discuss numerical results for the case where our model predicts dividend policy and 
retained earnings irrelevancy for equity (an unlevered firm) while allowing the possibility of external 
financing costs and discretional exercise of the growth option. Figure 1A presents numerical results in the 
presence and in absence of a growth option without default risk. Figure 1B considers the case involving 
positive fixed operating costs driving default risk. 
When focusing on the case with no default risk, we assume that operating costs and debt coupon 
payments are zero (no default risk, Ce = CR = 0). Our parameter choices for the risk-free rate (r = 0.036), 
volatility of revenues (σ = 0.2), and the corporate tax rate (τ = 0.3) are in line with prior studies (e.g., see 
Leland, 1994; Mauer and Sarkar, 2005; Goldstein et al., 2001; Hennessy and Whited., 2007). The risk-
free rate of 3.6% is based on the historical average of the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate for the period 
with available data (1934–2015).  A 5% (δ = 0.05) “dividend yield” or competitive erosion is used. A 5-
year intermediate horizon (T1 = 5) is chosen as typical for firm product development (e.g., see Pennings 
and Lint, 1997).
8
 A 10-year business planning and debt horizon (T2 = 10) is also common. We discuss the 
implications of varying these and other parameters in subsequent sections. We assume in the base case 
that the return earned on cash balances or retained earnings equals the risk-free rate (i.e., rx = r = 0.036). 
For the case “without growth” option in the left panel, we set e  = 1; for the “growth” investment case in 
the right panel, we assume an investment (exercise) cost X = 100 with  e = 3. We also consider cases both 
without (vE = 0) and with (vE = 0.10) variable external financing costs. Hennessy and Whited (2007) 
estimate external financing costs to be within the range 5%-10.7% depending on firm size.  
                                                          
8
 A 5-year horizon may be considered long as it creates a high range of potential revenue outcomes at T1 and T2 and 
reduces the potential for business planning, particularly with respect to retained earnings and future financing needs. 
We have examined shorter horizons in additional sensitivity results. Our general implications do not change, 
although we find that shorter horizons allow for better business planning and a somewhat enhanced role for retained 
earnings.   
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[Insert Figure 1] 
The left panel of Figure 1A confirms that in the absence of debt/default risk and growth options, 
unlevered firm (equity) value is invariant to the proportion of earnings retained (or the portion paid as 
dividends). The level of external financing costs here has no effect as there are no anticipated financing 
needs in the absence of fixed operating costs and debt payments. At intermediate decision time (T1), a 
zero retention ratio is optimal irrespective of the level of revenues. A small decline in the return earned on 
retained earnings, however, results in a violation of dividend/retained earnings irrelevancy. In this case, 
with rx < r, firm value declines with retained earnings, while when rx > r firm value increases in retained 
earnings (latter results not shown for brevity). The right panel of Figure 1A focuses on the case involving 
a discretionary growth option. Now, given a rising need for external financing, retained earnings acquire 
more value as they can be used to finance the growth option. In case of no external financing costs, 
retained earnings remain irrelevant even with a growth option available.  
Figure 1B considers the case involving positive fixed operating costs of 80 at T1 and T2 (Ce = 80), 
leading to scenarios with negative profits and the possibility of default.  In the “growth” option case of 
panel B, we again assume X = 100, e = 3. The left panel in Figure 1B shows that even in the absence of 
external financing costs, dividend/retained earnings policy is relevant when there is a risk of default. An 
increase in plowback (retained earnings) reduces firm value, with or without external financing costs.
9
 
The main reason for the negative relation between retained earnings and firm value is that, in the case of 
default, accumulated cash balances will be foregone for shareholders. With a growth option (right side of 
panel B), retained earnings play a more beneficial role in the presence of external financing 
costs.
10
Overall, the results of this extended numerical model are in line with and supportive of the analytic 
model results of the previous section. They confirm that the retained earnings/dividends choice is 
                                                          
9
 The case with external variable financing costs of 10% shows only minor differences and is thus not reported in the 
figures.     
10
 For this particular set of parameters, a positive role for retained earnings is not that apparent. We discuss in 
subsequent sections situations where the role of retained earnings is enhanced when external financing costs are 
substantial or when the firm considers debt financing. 
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irrelevant when retained earnings earn the risk-free rate (rx = r), when there is no default risk (no fixed 
debt or operating costs), and when there are no future growth options. Additionally, we show that 
dividend irrelevancy holds in the absence of external financing costs even when a costly growth option 
exists. That is because exercise of the growth option is discretional so that no exercise does not result in 
default and the firm stays in the existing mode of operations.    
4.2. Role of profitability and growth options with external financing costs  
This subsection re-examines the factors that enhance the role of retained earnings based on our extended 
numerical model of Appendix B. We focus on the effect of firm profitability, the volatility of revenues, 
and the impact of growth options on equity without financial leverage (unlevered firm). Figure 2 
examines the role of profitability, defined here as the level of revenues relative to operating costs. We 
consider fixed operating costs (Ce = 80) varying relative profitability from low (revenue P0 = 50) to high 
(revenue P0 = 150). Additionally, for Figure 2 we again assume: τ = 0.3, r = rx = 0.036, δ = 0.05, σ = 0.2, 
T1 = 5, T2=10, vE = 0.1 and that a growth option is available with cost X = 100, e = 3. Debt is set to zero 
(CR = 0, b = 1 focusing on an unlevered firm. In Figure 2, higher levels of retained earnings reduce 
unlevered firm/equity value when profitability is relatively low. However, at higher profitability, retained 
earnings have a positive impact on firm value. These results confirm the analytic results of proposition 3, 
however now we see that in the presence of external financing costs a more significant role for retained 
earnings is acquired. 
 [Insert Figure 2] 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of revenue volatility. The figure first verifies the well-known real 
options result that higher volatility increases growth option value and, indirectly, equity value (e.g., 
Trigeorgis, 1996).
11
 However, we show here that at higher revenue volatility, retained earnings have a 
more negative impact on unlevered firm (equity) value. This is manifested in a steeper negative effect of 
                                                          
11
  With debt financing, high volatility may adversely affect firm value (see Leland, 1994 and our subsequent 
analysis). 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
22 
 
higher retained earnings at higher volatility levels. This result is in line with Kisser (2013). However, in 
our case, it is driven by operating default risk regardless of whether there is a growth option. The above 
results regarding volatility are consistent with proposition 4 derived earlier using the simpler analytic 
setup. In the subsequent section we further analyse the effect of volatility on levered firm value as it 
illustrates interesting trade-offs between equity and debt financing obtained.   
[Insert Figure 3] 
Retained earnings can be more value enhancing when there are higher benefits from the growth 
option exercise. In Figure 4 Panel A, this is illustrated by varying the expansion factor e that drives the 
accrued benefits of the growth investment. The results confirm proposition 2 (derived using the simpler 
analytic setup) that a higher level of expansion benefits e enhances the beneficial role of retained 
earnings.  
[Insert Figure 4] 
Figure 4 Panel B assumes higher external financing costs, showing that the role of retained earnings is 
further enhanced. Compared with Panel A, which assumes financing costs of 10%, Panel B assumes 
financing costs of 20%, showing that unlevered firm (equity) value can increase in the plowback ratio at 
lower expansion factors. This extends our earlier result based on the analytic setup, demonstrating that the 
presence of external financing costs can result in a positive role of cash balances. We summarize this 
result below as an empirical prediction. 
Prediction 1 (external financing costs): A higher level of external financing costs further enhances the 
positive role of cumulating higher retained earnings.  
We note in this regard that with sufficiently high external financing in the presence of a costly growth 
option, a corner solution can be obtained where 100% plowback is optimal. This assumes rX = r. When rX 
is lower than r, internal solutions of optimal retention/payout policy can be obtained.  
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4.3. The role of debt financing 
In the presence of debt, the risk of default is inevitable so dividend irrelevancy does not hold even if there 
are no operating costs or growth options. Using our extended numerical model of Appendix B we show 
that if cumulated cash holdings accrue to debtholders in case of default, debt capacity is enhanced and 
equity value declines with higher retained earnings. This is in line with Morrelec (2001), who shows that 
liquid assets enhance debt capacity when there are debt covenants protecting debtholders from 
shareholders disposing liquid assets. We show that under a solution where retention is concurrently 
chosen with debt financing, the optimal retention ratio is determined by the relative impact of retained 
earnings on equity and debt values. A higher level of retained earnings enhances debt value while in 
general results in reduced equity value unless there are significant growth options and external financing 
costs.  Due to this opposite effect of retained earnings on equity and debt values, levered firm value may 
exhibit a U-shape with respect to retained earnings. Instead of a U-shape, a purely positive (negative) role 
of retained earnings can be obtained when debt enhancement is more (less) important than the reduction 
in equity.  
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of retained earnings on the levered firm, equity and debt holder 
values at two different levels of profitability.
12
 As noted, a higher level of retained earnings reduces 
equity but increases debt value. Equity value decreases due to the risk that accumulated cash holdings 
may be foregone in case of default. The overall effect on total levered firm value depends on the relative 
impact on equity and debt values, with a U-shaped relationship between firm value and retained earnings 
possible.  
[Insert Figure 5] 
                                                          
12
 In our simulations of Figure 5, because rX  = r, corner solutions are obtained. We obtain internal solutions of 
optimal retained earnings when rx < r. These results are in line with Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) who also obtain 
internal solutions for cash balance holdings when the return earned on cash holdings is lower than the discount rate. 
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We next summarize the following empirical prediction regarding the effect of retained earnings on debt, 
equity, and firm values. 
Prediction 2 (debt, equity, and firm value): A higher level of retained earnings can result in opposite 
directional effects on equity (negative) and debt value (positive), leading to a U-shaped effect on firm 
value.  
Figure 6 shows further insights regarding the impact of volatility on the role of retained earnings 
in the presence of debt. We use a relatively “normal” level of profitability with revenues P0 = 120 and a 
debt coupon of CR = 100 (operating costs Ce are here assumed zero). We distinguish between two cases, 
one in the absence of a growth option and one involving a costly growth option. In both cases we assume 
external financing costs vE = 10% of external financing needs. First, we observe that retained earnings 
have a positive impact on firm value both with and without a growth option, at low and high volatility due 
mainly to their enhancing role on debt capacity. An important insight gained here is that in the presence 
of a growth option, a high level of volatility combined with high levels of cumulated cash balances result 
in the highest levered firm value. A high volatility enhances equity value due to the presence of the 
growth option and higher cumulated cash balances help counterbalance the negative effects on debt 
capacity and reduce possible external financing needs. By comparison, in the no growth option case a 
lower volatility results in higher firm value due to the absence of significant upside growth potential for 
equity holders and significant external financing cost savings arising from financing the growth option 
with retained earnings. Both in the presence and in the absence of a growth option we verify a negative 
effect of retained earnings on equity value due to the presence of default risk where cumulated cash 
balances may be lost. However, we observe that higher volatility creates a more significant (steeper) 
negative effect of cumulated cash balances on equity value due to the higher default risk. On the other 
hand, a classic real option result obtains where higher volatility results in higher equity and lower debt 
values. Finally, we observe a positive role of retained earnings on debt value, which is more substantial 
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for higher volatility as exemplified by the steeper increase in debt value when the volatility of revenues is 
high.  
[Insert Figure 6] 
We summarize these results in the following prediction.  
Prediction 3 (volatility effect in the presence of debt and growth options): In the presence of growth 
options and debt, higher volatility enhances the role of retained earnings because it enhances the growth 
option value obtained by equity holders while the retained earnings can be used to limit external financing 
costs of financing the growth option. Furthermore, at high volatility a higher level of retained earnings 
sustains debt capacity.  
4.4. Effect of early investment timing (with growth option) 
In this section we perform a robustness test investigating a variation of the model that allows for early 
investment timing at t = 0 or at t = T1. The firm here can make the growth investment earlier, which 
allows for earlier enhancement of growth option revenues. For numerical model implementation see 
Appendix B. We assume here that with early growth option exercise, revenues are enhanced not just at T2 
(by e = 2) but also at T1 (by e = 2). Offsetting this benefit of earlier growth option exercise and 
intermediate revenue enhancement, the firm may now incur higher external financing costs earlier to 
finance the growth option if cash holdings available at an earlier stage are not sufficient. Figure 7 shows 
firm value for the decision to wait (W) or to exercise early (EE) the growth option at various levels of 
plowback and firm profitability. We contrast a low vs. high level of initial profitability affecting the 
financing costs of early-exercising the option (high vs. low). Here, the early exercise (EE) strategy is 
invariant to plowback because the firm in both scenarios does not have cash left after financing the 
growth option (kept as retained earnings).  
[Insert Figure 7] 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
26 
 
When initial profitability is low (and hence cash balances are insufficient to finance the growth 
investment), the firm may delay exercise of the investment option. Even though firm value is decreasing 
in plowback when the firm waits, firm values for the wait strategy (W) are higher than when the firm 
exercises early (EE). Firm value under early exercise (EE) is lower as the firm may lack sufficient cash 
balances and incurs high external financing costs early on to finance the growth option. Waiting (W) 
allows the firm to attain lower external financing costs as it may enter a more favourable state of revenues 
next period. In the second panel, the situation is reversed. When initial profitability is high and the 
funding gap small, external financing costs of exercising the growth option early (EE) are small, while the 
firm can benefit from the earlier enhancement of revenues. Our results regarding investment timing are 
summarized next. 
Prediction 4 (effect of retained earnings on optimal investment timing): when firm profitability or 
accumulated cash holdings from earlier periods are low, early investing is less appealing due to high 
external financing costs needed for exercising the growth option. With high firm profitability or high 
accumulated earnings, early investing in the growth option is more beneficial as the firm need not incur 
high external financing costs.  
4.5. Management-shareholder conflicts  
 Our analysis so far has been silent concerning the conflicts of interest between management and 
the firm’s shareholders. The management-shareholder conflict can have important shareholder value 
implications. For example, Gormley and Matsa (2016) show that managers may undertake value-
destroying decisions such as increasing cash holdings and lowering volatility. We next examine the 
impact of managerial-driven optimizing decisions --as opposed to firm (shareholder) value maximization 
assumed earlier -- to analyse the role of conflicts of interest between the management and shareholders.  
To more readily incorporate this type of analysis into our base numerical model setup, we assume 
that firm operating costs Ce reflect payments related to managerial compensation and focus on an 
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unlevered firm (zero debt). We further assume that shareholders face costs of collective action (see 
Lambrecht and Myers, 2008) so that if they intervene they obtain a fraction   times the value of the firm 
at t = 0, i.e.,  αV0, where 10    and 0V   is the optimal firm value (see Eq. (A.11) in Appendix B).  The 
costs of collective action also hold at T1, such that if shareholders intervene they obtain α times the firm 
value under a growth or no growth policy depending on which is optimal (see Eq. (A.9) in Appendix B). 
When the costs of collective action are zero or negligible ( = 1), our solutions reduce to those obtained 
under shareholder value maximization.  
As the costs of shareholders’ collective action increase (i.e., for values of   lower than 1), 
managerial-based optimization results in excessive cash holdings at t = 0. Intuitively, management 
chooses a high plowback upfront in order to reduce downside risk and ensure firm continuity and the 
collection of future managerial compensation. Confirming this insight, we also find that the firm defaults 
much later (at a lower revenue trigger) compared to the shareholder-value based optimal solution. 
Managerial-based optimization also results in earlier exercise of the growth option as it is partly financed 
with retained earnings. Earlier exercise of the growth option by management ensures enhanced revenues 
in the future period and thus reduced risk of loss of managerial compensation. We also find that at 
intermediate time T1, management may choose a lower plowback (compared to that used at t = 0) 
providing shareholders with a sufficient incentive to continue with operations (see also Lambrecht and 
Myers, 2012). We further find that for sufficiently high revenue levels, managers may choose to wait 
instead of exercise the growth option, i.e., the decision regions become {default, wait, exercise the growth 
option, wait} starting from low to high revenue values.
13
 Deviations from optimal firm valuation are more 
severe in the presence of growth options.  
                                                          
13
 Because the costs of collective action are proportional to firm value, enforcing exercise of the growth option at 
high revenue states is very costly for shareholders. From the management perspective, at these very high revenue 
states, the risk of default and the loss of future managerial compensation is at a minimum even if the firm waits 
(does not enhance future revenues by exercising the growth option). The result is that managers choose to wait 
instead of exercising the growth option at these high revenue states.  
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To illustrate our findings, consider a case with managerial compensation costs of 80 (Ce = 80) 
given the earlier base-case parameters (P0 =100, τ = 0.3, r = rx = 0.036, δ = 0.05, σ = 0.2, T1 = 5, T2=10, vE 
= 0.1) with the growth option (X = 100, e = 3).  Debt is zero (CR = 0, b = 1). Firm value optimization in 
the absence of shareholders’ costs of collective action (  = 1) results in a value of 107.43. With costs of 
collective action at 10% of firm value (i.e.,   = 0.9), firm value reduces to 103.52, involving agency 
costs of 3.78% and optimal managerial-driven plowback of 100% at t = 0. In an extreme case where 
shareholder intervention is not possible (  = 0), firm value declines to 88.55, resulting in agency costs of 
over 21%. These differences are due to a sub-optimally chosen high level of cumulated cash holdings at t 
= 0 and to managerial-driven investment and default policies resulting in earlier investment in the growth 
option, non-exercise of the growth option at very high revenue levels and in delayed default. To illustrate 
the differences in decision regions, we compare the decision region for the case with no costs of collective 
action (  = 1) with the case where costs of collective action are at the highest level (  = 0). In the case 
of   = 1, the firm defaults at T1 when revenues )46.76,0[P . By comparison, when   = 0 the firm 
delays default to much lower levels, when )99.19,0[P . When   = 1 the firm waits when
)35.109,46.76[P  and then exercises the growth option at revenue levels higher than 109.35. By 
contrast, when   = 0 the firm waits when )47.58,99.19[P  and exercises the growth option much 
earlier (at lower revenue levels), in the region )2737,47.58[P . Moreover, for revenue levels that are 
very high, the firm waits. When   = 0  firm plowback at t = 1 ranges between 55% and 15% for revenue 
levels )5.119,99.19[P  and zero plowback for revenues higher than 119.59. On the other hand, under a 
shareholder-based optimal solution plowback remains zero for all revenue levels.  
In the absence of the growth option in the above situation, management will choose 100% 
plowback at t = 0 when   = 0 to minimize default risk, whereas in the absence of costs of collective 
action (  = 1) plowback at t = 0 is zero. Firm value in this case with no shareholder intervention drops to 
81.84 (compared to a firm optimal of 94.51 when   = 1). The maximum level of agency costs due to 
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managerial-shareholder conflicts in the no-growth case is less than 16% (compared to 21% in the case 
with a growth option). We offer the following empirical prediction. 
Prediction 5 (manager-shareholder conflicts): In the presence of costs of collective action by 
shareholders, payout policies chosen by managers to maximize own managerial compensation can result 
in excessive levels of cash balances and delayed default. Resulting firm value reduction (compared to 
shareholder-based value optimization) is more severe in the presence of growth options as managerially-
driven payout solutions result in sub-optimal exercising of the growth options.  
It is worthy here to relate our findings to recent studies justifying dividend smoothing. In general 
our setup does not result in dividend smoothing behaviour. When costs of collective action are low (high 
 ) we find that managerial-based policies are aligned with shareholders’ preferences to distribute excess 
cash. This implies erratic changes in dividends from period to period that depend on the variation in 
profitability. When costs of collective action are high (  is low), managers tend to cumulate large cash 
balances initially but may pay substantially higher dividends later on to keep shareholders happy to 
continue operations.
14
 This also implies some erratic (rather than smooth) dividends behavior across 
periods. Lambrecht and Myers (2012) obtain dividend smoothing when shareholder costs of collective 
action are combined with managerial risk aversion and habit formation. In another context, Acharya and 
Lambrecht (2015) justify smoothing in the presence of information differences between managers and 
shareholders as managers smooth dividends to meet shareholders’ expectations. Our model does not 
incorporate these features, however it captures default, limited liability and growth options. It would be an 
interesting avenue for further research to extend our setup to multiple stages of growth in the presence of 
                                                          
14
 When future revenues are high, managers pay high dividends even when the costs of collective action are high 
(we typically obtain that plowback is zero at high revenue levels). Thus, managers align dividend policy with the 
interests of shareholders because they face little risk of losing future managerial compensation. When revenues are 
at medium levels, managers use part of retained earnings to finance the growth option. In this case it is unlikely that 
dividends will be paid out to shareholders, however shareholders will tend to accept this since they avoid the costs 
of collective action and external financing costs while they capture high future revenue growth. For low level of 
revenues, exercise of the growth option may no longer be possible, so managers choose to remain in the existing 
mode of operation and to partly finance any shortfall with cumulated cash balances. Because in this case the growth 
option investment cost is avoided, managers may pay some dividends to shareholders allowing them enough 
benefits to continue instead of defaulting. 
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default risk examining whether there are conditions where dividend smoothing might be obtained within 
our current setup.
15
    
5. Conclusions 
We have developed a real options model of retained earnings (dividend) choice in the presence of growth 
options, debt financing with risk of default and bankruptcy costs under revenue uncertainty. Our simpler 
analytic setup helped clarify the conditions for retained earnings or dividend irrelevancy uncovering the 
main drivers affecting the retained earnings/dividend choice. Our model confirms that dividend policy 
irrelevancy depends critically on the absence of default risk. In the presence of growth options, dividend 
irrelevancy holds if there are no costs of external financing. Lower firm profitability and higher revenue 
volatility favor higher dividend payout due to the risk that shareholders will lose any accumulated cash 
balances in case of default. A significant role of retained earnings under high volatility is obtained in the 
presence of significant growth options and debt financing. We highlight a complementary role of retained 
earnings on debt capacity especially when there is high risk of default such as in case of low profitability 
and high revenue volatility. With regard to investment timing, we show that when current profitability 
and cumulated cash balances are high the firm will favor early exercise of the growth option avoiding 
high costs of external financing. We also discuss management-shareholder conflicts over payout policy 
when shareholders face significant costs of collective action. We find that deviations from optimal firm 
value are more pronounced when there is suboptimal exercise of growth options and that managers 
choose excessive cash holdings to avoid default and the loss of managerial compensation. Several testable 
implications and predictions stand out, providing a platform for further empirical work in this important 
area at the intersection of investment, financing and dividend/retention policies.  
 
                                                          
15
 We have also investigated the impact of superimposing a partial adjustment (dividend smoothing) model of 
Michaely and Roberts (2012) in our numerical model framework. The presence of a partial adjustment equation for 
dividends acts as an additional constraint resulting in firm value reductions that may reach 16%-21% depending on 
whether there are growth options or not. Of course, such estimates are indicative on the true impact on firms since 
our model is not fully calibrated with the data (and furthermore it is not a multi-period model).  
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Appendix A: Proof of equation (4) deriving the sensitivity of equity value with respect to retained 
earnings 
 
In order to prove equation (4) we prove that: 
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Thus, 0)())(exp()()exp()1( 2010  dneRXrTdnTPe
TrX  and after this simplification we can thus 
obtain equation (4): )())exp((1 2
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Appendix B: An extended numerical model 
In this appendix we present a numerical model that extends the simple analytic setup in 3 periods, 
t = 0 , t = 1 (at T1) and t = 2 (at T2). P denotes firm revenues following a GBM shown in Eq. (1) of the 
main text.  In this more general setting we allow for operating costs per period Ce for periods t = 0, t = 1 
and t = 2 . Debt ( 0
~
B ) issued at t = 0 and maturing at T2 requires financial costs CR in periods t = 1 and t = 
2. Total costs (sum of operating plus financial) in periods 1 and 2 is denoted by C. The firm has a growth 
option at T1 by incurring a cost X  that if paid results in an enhancement in revenues in the last period by
e . We define two mode of operations: mode S where the firm does not exercise the growth option (stays 
in existing mode) and mode G where the firm exercises the growth option. We suppress investment 
timing flexibility.
16
   
A constant corporate tax rate τ applies, so that after-tax profits per period are 
)1)(( 00  eCP at t = 0 and )1)(( 11  CP  at t = 1. After-tax profits at t = 2 are 
)1)()1(( 22  CPe
ii , GSi ,  and depend on whether the firm’s equityholders have not exercised 
the growth option (mode S) at T1 in which case 0
Se or have exercised the growth option at T1 (mode G) 
in which case eeG  .  Unlevered after-tax profits are )1)((  ettU CP  at  t = 0,1 and 
)1)()1(( 22  e
ii
U CPe , i= S, G, at t = 2 with 0
Se  and eeG  . The expected present value of 
future unlevered cash flows is denoted by itUV
~
, .,GSi  The value of unlevered assets includes an option 
to abandon so it cannot become negative. 
The debt amount 0
~
B  raised at t = 0 reflects the expected present value of financial (coupon) 
payments CR in periods t = 1 and t = 2 or the value of unlevered assets after incurring proportional 
bankruptcy costs b in the event of default. Debt values in period t = 1 (at T1) and period t = 2 (at T2) are 
denoted by GSitB it ,,2,1,   since they depend on whether the growth option is exercised or not.  
                                                          
16
 The version of the model with investment timing flexibility is available uppon request.  
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The firm’s control variable tx  defines the proportion of the period revenues Pt   and any 
cumulated cash balances retained by the firm in each period t, 1,0t . In period 0 retained earnings are 
.000  xR  We assume liquid assets earn Xr  annually (continuously compounded).
17
 Retained earnings 
in period t = 1 (at T1) depend on whether the firm exercises or not the growth option and is denoted by
GSiR i ,,1  . They depend on the choice of proportion GSix
i
t ,,  , on cumulated cash balances from 
earlier periods and whether the firm is profitable in period t = 1, thus:  
                              0 if))exp(( 110111  TrRxR X
ii                                                                 
(A.1) 
                                 GSiTrRxR X
ii ,0    if))exp(( 11011                                                 
(A.2)    
Eq. (A.1) shows that when profits are positive the firm may choose to retain earnings from current period 
profits and cumulated cash balances from earlier periods. In Eq. (A.2) we allow for partial or total transfer 
of any cumulated earnings from earlier periods to the next period even when the profitability of period 1 
is negative.
18
 In the last period (T2) retained earnings accumulated, i.e, GSiTTrRR X
ii ,))(exp(( 1212 
are paid out to shareholders, unless the firm defaults.  
When profits are negative, the choice of ix1  in Eq. (A.2) determines the level of internal financing 
iF1  
used by the firm: 
                                                    .,0  if  ))exp()1( 11011 GSiTrRxF X
ii                                            
(A.3) 
                                                          
17
 We implictly assume that there is no working capital and thus net income is equivalent to cash flows. These cash 
flows if not distributed are assumed to be kept in the form of liquid assets earning rx. A tax-disadvatage of 
cumulating cash (compared to debt financing) may be incorporated by reducing the return earned on cash balances.  
18
 This may hold even when external financing is costly when the return earned on liquid balances rX is sufficiently 
high compared to the discount rate in which case the firm may not use all cumulated cash to finance shortfalls but 
instead partially or fully finance the deficit using external financing. 
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The choice of retained earnings in each period determines dividends. Thus, dividends at t = 0 are 
000 )1(  xD . In period t = 1 (at T1) dividends depend on the profits of the period, any cumulated cash 
balances from earlier periods and whether or not there is an exercise of the growth option, thus: 
                          0    if))exp()(1( 110111  TrRXxD X
iii                                                            
(A.4) 
                          .,0      if 1111 GSiFXD
iii                                                                  
In Eq. (A.4) XXX GS  ,0  and iF1  is defined in Eq. (A.3).  
We define an indicator function IE that takes the value of 1 if external financing is needed and 0 
otherwise as follows: 
                                               1EI    if    011 
ii FX                                                                    
(A.5) 
                                                0EI   otherwise.  
In Eq. (A.5) XXX GS  ,0  and iF1  for GSi ,  are defined in Eq. (A.3).  
If the firm resorts to external financing this involves a cost 
EX  which is proportion vE to the level 
of external financing needed:  
                        
.,0 if                              0
1 if)( 11
GSiIX
IFXvX
EE
E
ii
EE


                                                        
(A.6) 
The optimal retained earnings is selected over a discrete set of choices ]1,0[0 x  in period t = 0 and 
GSix i ,],1,0[1   in period t = 1 (at T1) while all cumulated cash flows are distributed as dividends to the 
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equity holders in the last period t = 2 (at T2) unless the firm defaults. Define the equity value function at 
time t as ),( itt
i
t RPE which depends on the state of revenues Pt and the control variable 
i
tR  (controlled by 
equity holders through itx  ) for modes i = S,G. The forward-backward dynamic programming 
optimization works as follows. Given the choice of retained earnings in earlier periods, moving forward 
in the last period t = 2 (at T2) we have the following optimality condition for equity holders: 
                               GSiRRPE iiii ,)0,max(),( 22222                                                (A.7) 
                                where    .))(exp( 1122
i
X
i RTTrR                                                                                                                                       
The resulting debt value based on coupon level CR in period t = 2 (at T2) is:  
                     GSiCB R
i ,2     if        0),( 222 RPE
i    or                                                (A.8) 
                    ))0,)(max(1( 222
ii
U
i RbB    if    0),( 222 RPE
i                                                                              
Then, moving backwards, in period t = 1 (at T1) the following optimality condition holds for equity 
holders:   
                                        



 ),(max),,((max),( 111111
*
111
11
GG
x
SS
x
RPERPERPE
GS
                                     (A.9) 
                                         where 
                                         ),0,
~
max(),( 11111
S
EE
SSS EIXDRPE     
                                         )0,
~
max(),( 11111
G
EE
GSG EIXDRPE  . 
The values for GSiD i ,,1  , EX   and EI  are defined in Eq. (A.4-A.6). Note that 
iE1
~
 (and iB1
~
 that 
follows in the next equation) denote the expected continuation value of equity and debt calculated using 
the binomial probabilities as of T1.   
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Debt value in period t = 1 (at T1) is calculated as follows:   
                                        0),(    if
~
11111  RPEBCB
ii
R
i                                                            (A.10) 
                                            .,0),(   if ))0,
~
)(max(1( 1111111 GSiRPERVbB
iii
UU
i                        
At t = 0 the following optimality condition holds in order to obtain total levered firm value (obtained by 
equity holders): 
                                               )
~~
(max),( 000
*
000
0
BEDRPV
x
                                                         (A.11) 
The optimization is based on a first-best optimal firm value taking into consideration both 0
~
E  which is 
the expected continuation value of equity and the level of debt financing 0
~
B  raised by equity holders at t 
= 0. When debt is zero (effected by setting CR =0 and b = 1) then 0V  in Eq.(A.11) is the unlevered firm 
(equity value). We solve the problem numerically by building a forward-backward algorithm of 
exhaustive search over all retained earnings choices using binomial trees (see Cox, Ross and Rubinstein, 
1979).
19
 We use 1N  steps for the first period T1. For each end-state value of the stochastic revenue ( tP ) 
at T1, a new lattice for the remaining period ( 12 TT  ) is built using N2 steps, where dtTTN /)( 122   
with dt as above. Thus, several binomial lattices emanate during T2 from each ending node at T1. Our 
algorithm applies an exhaustive search among a grid of plowback choices at t = 0 (ranging from 0 to 
100% with small increments), then goes forward and for each end-state at T1 evaluates the optimal 
plowback using a new grid search for plowback choices, goes backwards to find firm value at t = 0 and 
then repeats the process using new plowback choices at t = 0 until the level that maximizes firm value is 
obtained. Further details on construction of binomial trees using a forward-backward approach are 
provided in Koussis et al. (2013).   
                                                          
19
 The lattice parameters for the up and down multiplicative jumps and the up and down probabilities are: 
)exp( dtu  , ,/1 ud 
du
ddtr
pu



))exp(( 
, 
ud pp 1 , where 11 / NTdt  . 
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Figure 1. Optimal retained earnings (plowback ratio) at t = 0 for an unlevered firm (equity) in 
possible presence of external financing costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In Figure 1A (without default) we assume P0 =100, operatng costs Ce = 0, zero debt (CR = 0, b = 1), τ = 0.3, r = 
rx = 0.036, δ = 0.05, σ = 0.2, T1 = 5, T2  = 10 years. In “no growth option” case we use e = 1 and in “growth option” 
case exercise cost  is X = 100 and e = 3. We assume either vE = 0 or variable external financing costs vE = 0.1. In 
Figure 1B (with default risk) we set Ce = 80 (adding risk of default) and in “growth option” case exercise cost X = 
100 and  e = 3.  The numerical solutions are based on the lattice model with N1 = 100 steps.  
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Figure 2. Impact of firm profitability on retained earnings (plowback) policy for an unlevered firm 
(equity) in the presence of external financing costs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Impact of revenue volatility on retained earnings (plowback) policy at t = 0 on unlevered 
firm/equity in the presence of external financing costs 
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Note: We assume operating costs Ce = 80, zero debt (CR = 0, b =1), τ = 0.3, r = rx= 0.036, δ = 0.05, σ = 0.2, T1 = 5, T2 
= 10 years, variable external financing costs vE = 0.1. For the growth option we assume  exercise cost is X = 100, e = 
3. For low firm profitability we use P0 = 90 and for high profitability P0 = 150. The numerical solutions are based on 
the lattice model with N1 = 100 steps.  
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with exercise cost X = 100, e = 3. We vary revenue volatility (σ) between 0.2 and 0.4. The numerical solutions are 
based on the lattice model with N1 = 100 steps.  
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Figure 4. Impact of growth (expansion) option and financing costs on retained earnings (plowback) 
policy at t = 0 for unlevered firm (equity) 
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0.2, T1 =5, T2  = 10 years, growth option has exercise cost X = 100 with  e = 3 or e = 5. In Panel A we use 
variable external financing costs vE = 0.1 and in Panel B vE = 0.2. The numerical solutions are based on the 
lattice model with N1 = 100 steps.  
 
 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
46 
 
 Figure 5. Impact of profitability on equity, debt and firm value with debt financing 
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lattice model with N1 = 100 steps.  
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Figure 6. Impact of revenue volatility on retained earnings (plowback ratio) policy with debt 
financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We assume P0 =120, debt coupon CR = 100, operating costs Ce =0,  τ = 0.3, b = 0.2, r = rx = 0.036, δ = 0.05, T1 
= 5, T2 = 10 years, and e = 1 (no growth option). With growth option (Panel B) we assume growth option costs X = 
100  with e = 3. For high volatility we assume σ = 0.4 and for low volatility σ = 0.2.Variable external financing costs 
vE = 0.1. The numerical solutions are based on the lattice model with N1 = 100 steps.  
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Figure 7. Impact of investment timing in growth option exercise on retained earnings (plowback) 
policy at different levels of profitability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We assume P0 =150 or 90, operating cost Ce = 80, zero debt (CR = 0, b =1),  τ = 0.3, r = rx = 0.036, δ = 0.05, σ 
= 0.2, T1 = 5, T2 = 10 years. For the growth option we here assume e = 1.5 with cost X = 50. Variable external 
financing costs vE = 0.1.  “W” defines the value of the firm when it chooses to wait to exercise the growth option 
until T1,  and “EE” denotes early exercise of the growth option at t = 0. In the latter case the firm needs to finance 
the shortage with costly external financing when retained earnings do not suffice. Panel A represents the case of low 
profitability, assuming P0   = 90. Panel B represents high profitability (P0 = 150). The numerical solutions are based  
on the lattice model with N1 = 100 steps.  
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